Developmental causation and the problem of homology by Baum, David A.
While it is  generally agreed that the concept of homology refers  to individuated traits 
that have been inherited from common ancestry, we still lack an adequate account of 
trait individuation or inheritance. Here I propose that we utilize a counterfactual 
criterion of causation to link each trait with a developmental-causal (DC) gene. A DC gene is 
made up of the genetic information (which might or might not be physically contiguous 
in the genome) that is  needed for the production of the organismic attributes that 
comprise the trait. I argue that individuated traits—phenes—correspond to organismic 
features that are caused by DC genes. Using such an approach, we can define a DC map, 
which shows  the relations  between each pair of phenes  and provides a succinct summary 
of genotype-phenotype relationships and phenotypic complexity. Phenes in parents  and 
offspring are judged to be homologous  if their DC genes  are composed of orthologous 
genetic factors. When comparing more distantly related organisms, traits  are homologous 
when linked by a chain of parent-offspring homologs  along the path of ancestry that 
links  the two organisms. There are three possible ways to deal with the potential for 
multiple equivalent DC genes: maximal, minimal, and consensus  homology. Whereas 
maximal homology has  limited utility, the other two approaches  have value and can help 
to guide research at the intersection of  evolution and development.
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1. Introduction
The homology relation refers  to the idea that different organisms  of the same or different species  share 
the same traits. For example, it is  generally agreed that my middle finger nail and your middle finger nail are 
homologous  with one other and with the hoof of a horse. As  this  example shows, homology does  not require 
that the structures  in question be identical in form or function. So what notion of “sameness” is  connoted by 
homology? Darwin and subsequent biologists  have generally agreed that the concept of homology relates  in 
some way to descent from common ancestry (e.g., Lankaster 1870). A fingernail and a hoof are homologous 
because the common ancestor of a human and a horse had a structure that became modified to give rise to 
the human middle finger nail and the horse’s hoof.
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While the idea is simple, nailing down (no pun intended) the concept of homology has  proved 
challenging, to say the least. While all agree that homology depends  in some way on common ancestry, the 
manner of this  dependence is  far from clear. In particular, how can homology refer to the inheritance of 
traits  from common ancestry when phenotypic traits  are not passed on from generation to generation? 
Thankfully, we do not pass on our fingernails to our children by direct grafting! 
This paper is  built on the premise that in order to get traction on homology, and put the concept to work 
in comparative biology, we first need to solve a much less  studied conceptual problem: the nature of traits. 
When observing an organism we get the sense that it may be atomized into parts  in some objective way. At 
the very least, it would be agreed that some pieces  of an organism are not meaningful traits. For example, 
half my fingernail plus a corner of my earlobe do not together constitute a meaningful part of my body. Nor 
even half my fingernail plus a small piece of contiguous  finger. But what makes some parts  of an organism 
meaningful and some not? How are traits individuated?
The inheritance of traits  through time and the atomization of organisms into individuated traits  are 
linked because each are seen as  depending on development: the process  by which a genotype interacts  with a 
specific environment to generate a phenotype (e.g., Wagner 1989; Abouheif et al. 1997; Laubichler 2000; 
Wagner et al. 2000; Hall 2003; Wagner 2007). There have been attempts to equate traits  with modules  of 
developmental programs  (e.g., Wagner 1996), but, while the idea of developmental modules is  appealing, 
precisely defining these modules  has  been difficult. Furthermore, the claim that modules emerge as a result 
of selection (whether at the individual or clade level) remains  unsubstantiated. In this  paper I develop an 
alternative conception of trait individuation based on developmental causation, which leads  to a precise 
definition of homology, or rather a family of three closely related homology concepts. This  causal criterion 
avoids  some of the pitfalls  of similarity-based conceptions  of homology. The three closely related homology 
concepts  can be marshaled to clarify empirical research programs  in comparative morphology, systematics, 
and evolutionary developmental biology. 
2. A Counterfactual Causal Criterion for Developmental-Causal Genes and Phenes
In order for traits  to be individuated in some way that would allow for them to be seen as  heritable, the 
basis  of their individuation must relate to genotypic information. I propose that traits  be attached to the 
genetic factors  that are needed for them to be present in a specific organism in a specific environment. Take 
one organism in one environment and conduct the following thought experiment. Visit each genetic factor 
in the genome, which is to say each gene, functional subdomain of a gene, cis-regulatory element, and so on, 
and ask: What features  (if any) would be absent from the organism in the current environment if this  genetic 
factor were not present?1 In other words, apply a counterfactual criterion of causation to ask if this  genetic 
factor causes  some aspect of the organism’s  phenotype. We do this  by noting exactly which features of the 
organism depend on this  genetic factor. By “feature” I mean any attribute that is  measurable or observable, 
at least in principle.2 
Once we have considered every individual genetic factor in the genome,3 we proceed to consider every 
possible set of genetic factors  that have non-additive causal effects. We could start by visiting each possible 
pair of genetic factors  (adjacent or distant) and ask: What aspects  of the phenotype depend on the presence 
of these two genetic factors  together? That is, what features  depend on this  combination of genetic factors  and 
cannot be explained simply by adding up the effects of the individual genetic factors  in question? As  an 
example, suppose that the counterfactual absence of genetic factor 1 results  in the lack of attribute A, and 
the absence of genetic factor 2 results  in the lack of attribute B. If the counterfactual loss  of both genetic 
factors  1 and 2 at the same time resulted in the loss  of attributes  A, B, and C, then C could be viewed as 
being causally dependent on a compound genetic cause, 1+2. Moreover, we could consider triplets  of 
genetic factors  that together cause further phenotypic features, and so on, until we have considered every 
possible subset of  genetic factors in the genome.4
Let us  define an individual or set of genetic factors  that causes  some phenotypic attribute as a 
developmental-causal (DC) gene. A DC gene is  a subset of the genome, which might correspond to a localized 
segment of DNA or a heterogeneous set of genomic regions (in the case of compound genetic causes), that is 
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needed for some particular aspect of the phenotype to be expressed. An aspect of the phenotype that is 
dependent on a DC gene is termed a phene.5 These and other key terms are summarized in Table 1. 
The strategy of providing a new conception of “gene,” distinct from the transcript-encoding units  of 
molecular genetics, is  not unique to this  context. A similar strategy has been used in population genetics, 
where “gene” often has  its  own special purpose definition to refer to a contiguous  stretch of DNA that has 
not been subject to recombination. The DC gene concept is  different from the molecular genetic and 
recombinational gene concepts  in that it may be composed of stretches  of DNA on different chromosomes. 
However, like these other gene concepts, it is  a useful abstraction because it captures  the idea that our focus 
in developmental genetics is on portions of  the genome that cause aspects of  the phenotype.
The counterfactual thought experiment atomizes  a single organism, asking what would be absent from 
the phenotype if particular genetic factors  had not been present in the genome. It is, of course, impossible to 
literally run this  experiment. However, assuming that the mapping from genotype to phenotype (the DC 
map) is  conserved among individual organisms  within a model species, we can use studies  of mutants  and 
other genetic manipulations to explore the phenotypic attributes  caused by different genetic factors  within 
this  shared DC map. Thus, the research program implied by the counterfactual casual criterion is eminently 
practical; it has  been progressing since the early 20th century under the moniker of genetics. Much genetic 
research is  motivated by the molecular analysis  of genes and the reconstruction of genetic “pathways.” 
However, another important goal of genetics  is  the identification of gene function, where function is  often 
understood as  a process  or feature that depends  essentially on the gene (e.g., Stadler et al. 2009). As  such, 
“gene function” is  similar to “phene,” showing the rather close analogies  between the developmental-causal (DC)
approach and standard genetics. Indeed, mutagenesis  studies have sometimes  been conducted with the 
explicit aim of  individuating traits (e.g., Monteiro et al. 2003).
3. Implications of  the Counterfactual Approach to Trait Individuation
On the DC approach, phenes  have objective reality in much the same way that clades  have reality in 
phylogenetic systematics. A clade, or monophyletic group, corresponds  to exactly that set of organisms  that 
would not exist if a specific ancestor (a historical cause) had not existed. Similarly, a phene corresponds  to 
that piece of an organism that would not be present if a specific DC  gene had not existed in the genome. 
Thus, insofar as  one considers clades  to be individuals, phenes  are too. An additional point of similarity to 
clades  can be highlighted. A taxon might be equally dependent on one, two, or more specific ancestors—
counterfactually, the loss  of any of several ancestral organisms would result in the loss  of exactly the same 
Table 1 — Glossary of  key terms
Term Definition
Developmental-causal (DC) gene
One or multiple genetic factors that collectively cause some feature of  the organism (in a specified 
environment)
Developmental-causal (DC) map A representation, perhaps in Euler diagram format, of  the relationships among multiple phenes
Equivalent DC genes DC genes that cause the same phene
Genetic factor
A localized part of  the genome (or epigenome), perhaps corresponding to a gene, functional gene domain, or 
regulatory element, which has the potential to be required for some aspect of  the phenotype
Phene The set of  features of  an organism that are caused by a DC gene or a set of  equivalent DC genes
Trait A feature or part of  an organism that is hypothesized to correspond to a phene
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set of extant organisms. Likewise, multiple DC genes  might cause the same phenotypic attribute, in which 
case the phene is multiply determined by several equivalent DC genes. 
I contend that most visible and familiar phenotypic features  (e.g., lungs, leaves, and antennae) 
correspond to multiply determined phenes. My reasoning is  that such organs  tend to have complex, highly 
regulated developmental programs in which many gene products  interact in completing many processes. As 
a result, there ought to be many combinations of hypothetical mutations  that would result in the obliteration 
of an entire organ. If this assumption is  correct, these organs  will be associated with multiple equivalent DC 
genes. Even though  my contention that many familiar phenes  are associated with multiple equivalent DC 
genes colors my conceptual framework, the model does not depend on the veracity of  this claim.
There are very many but not infinitely many genetic factors  in the genome and, consequently, there are 
a finite number of DC genes and phenes  (the number of phenes  being equal to or less  than the number of 
DC genes  because of equivalency). The total number of phenes in an organism, a simple measure of 
phenotypic complexity, will likely be influenced by the size of the genome, which aligns  with the perception 
that multicellular eukaryotes are more complex than unicellular eukaryotes  and prokaryotes. However, we 
should not expect a perfect correlation with genome size. For example, parts  of the genome that are 
developmentally inert and have no impact on the phenotype would not be DC genes, and therefore could 
not contribute to phenotypic complexity. Thus, an organism whose genome contains  much junk DNA could 
be less  phenotypically complex than an organism with a smaller, but more consistently functional, genome. 
Furthermore, organisms  with the same number of DC  genes  may differ in phenotypic complexity if one 
organism has a higher number of  equivalent DC genes.
An important implication of the finite number of phenes  is  that some parts  of organisms are not phenes. 
So, while the phene concept is  permissive in that a single organism can be composed of a very large number 
of phenes, some “parts” of an organism that we might refer to may not be individuated validly. Some 
putative traits  may correspond to relations among phenes, while not being phenes  themselves. For example, 
it is  plausible that there is  no individuated “right forelimb” in vertebrates. Instead, this  part could represent 
merely the intersection of two individuated phenes: one composed of the two forelimbs, and one composed 
of the two limbs on the right side of the body. If this  is  the case, then there would be no set of mutations, 
however improbable, that could result in an organism that was  intact in all regards except lacking its  right 
forelimb.6 Other putative traits  may not even be relations among phenes, especially those mentioned earlier: 
“half my fingernail plus  a small piece of contiguous  finger” and “half my fingernail plus  a corner of my 
earlobe.” 
This leads to another parallel with phylogenetic systematics. The relationship between trait and phene is 
very much like that between taxon and clade. “Good” traits  are phenes, in much the same way that “good” 
taxa are clades. In other words, indicating the existence of a trait, perhaps  by anointing it with a name, 
amounts  to positing the hypothesis  that this  part of the organism is a phene. This  hypothesis is, at least in 
principle, testable. My ambition is  that the phene concept might help focus  the attention of developmental 
biologists  on the opportunities  to test trait individuation hypotheses  by reference to genetic experiments  in 
much the same way that phylogenetics gives systematists rigorous ways to test taxon hypotheses.
4. A Developmental-Causal Map Summarizes the Relations among Phenes
Before exploring the implications  of developmental causation for homology, it is  useful to introduce a 
framework for representing the relationship between genotype and phenotype: a developmental-causal (DC) map. 
This map summarizes  the logical relationships among the phenes caused by each DC gene. To build such a 
map we would consider each pair of DC genes  in the genome and note whether the phenes  they cause 
intersect  (meaning that some piece of the organism is  dependent upon both genetic factors), and if they 
intersect, how. Table 2 lists  the five possible relations  among each pair of DC genes. A representation of the 
relations  among the DC genes  in a genome—a DC map—can be summarized in the form of a triangular 
matrix whose entries  display which of these five relations  holds  among each pair of DC genes. This  would be 
the most efficient format for computational tracking of developmental causation, and could be added to 
existing databases  that contain information on mutant phenotypes  (e.g., FlyBase or TAIR). However, for 
conceptual purposes, a more attractive representation is  an Euler diagram, where phenes  are depicted as 
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ovals  and areas of overlap between ovals  indicates whether those phenes  share phenotypic features. Figure 1 
is a cartoon of  a very limited DC map in Euler and matrix forms.
A DC map succinctly summarizes  the relationship between the genotype and the phenotype. This  map is 
not built upon human judgment as  to which traits  are valid. Rather, all that humans need to do is 
document, with studies of actual or theoretical mutants, the attributes  of the organism that are dependent 
on each DC  gene and the overlap between those phenes. The phenotypic attributes  per se are not important, 
only their relationships matter.7 While this  organization of genetic data is  practical, it is not the standard 
approach, which typically entails  descriptions  of phenotypes  in terms  of loosely defined trait descriptors 
(“leaf,” “humerus,” etc.). 
The DC map is  distinct from other ways  of summarizing developmental programs: genetic network 
diagrams, or Boolean operator representations. These summarize alternative trait states  that may arise from 
a series  of genetic or molecular interactions  and are optimized for communicating local mechanistic aspects 
of development. In contrast to DC maps, these graphs  of development are not readily expandable to a large 
number of genes. Furthermore, these approaches  generally presume trait individuation rather than 
providing a framework for understanding how development serves to bound traits.
Stadler et al. (2001) and Wagner and Stadler (2003) proposed an alternative format for representing the 
genotype-phenotype map. The core idea is  a graph in which all possible complete genotypes are associated 
with nodes, and edges  link pairs of genotypes  that are one mutational step apart. Equivalence sets  of nodes 
are defined as those that are associated with the same phenotype. This  conception allows  for a mathematical 
description of character individuation by the criterion of quasi-independence. The underlying assumption 
Table 2 — Possible relationships between the phenotypic features caused by two genetic factors (A and B) and 
their corresponding symbolic representation.
Case Content of  the Intersection Symbol
A and B are disjunct Nothing [A] ∅ [B]
A is a proper subset of  B All of  A and some of  B [A] ⊂ [B]
B is a proper subset of  A Some of  A and all of  B [A] ⊃ [B]
A and B partially overlap Some of  A and some of  B [A] ∩ [B]
A and B are equivalent All of  A and All of  B [A] = [B]
Figure 1 — A cartoon of a hypothetical DC map. This  map contains 
four DC genes and three phenes. The relationships among the 
phenotypic attributes caused by each DC gene can be indicated by 
overlap in the Euler diagram or in matrix format. The format shows 
the directed relationship between the DC gene to the left relative to 
that above: ∩ (partial overlap); ∅ (disjoint); = (equivalent); ⊃ 
(includes); ⊂ (included by).
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of quasi-independence—that “natural selection can adjust one character without permanently altering other 
attributes of the phenotype” (Wagner and Stadler 2003)—comes very close to the DC mapping framework 
developed here. However, their model differs  in two important regards. First, they organize the graphical 
space around genotypes  rather than phenotypes. Second, they do not condition on the current genotype and 
phenotype, but simultaneously consider the universe of all possible genotypes and phenotypes. Their 
approach may allow for a smoother integration with theoretical quantitative genetics  but is  less  intuitive than 
DC mapping and provides a less direct approach to trait individuation and homology.
5. Parent-Offspring Trait Homology
We should expect a developmental-causal concept of homology to provide an account of trait 
inheritance between one generation and the next. Ramsey and Peterson (2012), in an otherwise very useful 
discussion of homology, suggest that the sameness of traits  between parents  and offspring rests  merely on 
similarity: “the sameness  of the traits  from one generation to the next is  derived from their similarity” (p. 
265). This  is  unsatisfactory because similarity lies  in the eye of the beholder. Such a view implies  that trait 
inheritance is not purely biological but depends in some way on human perception.
Even before the molecular basis  of the gene was discovered, it was clear that the sharing of genetic 
information is an important explanation for the sharing of traits  between species, i.e., homology (e.g., 
Boyden 1943). However, it also has  long been clear that there is  not a one-to-one correspondence between 
individual genes  and traits. One response is  to fall back on concepts  other than the gene to explain trait 
persistence through time, including “essential genetic agreement” (Hubbs  1944), “continuity of 
information” (Van Valen 1982), and “sharing of pathways of development” (Roth 1984). I am attempting a 
different strategy that defines  a developmentally relevant notion of “gene” (the DC gene) in order to explain 
the persistence of phenotypic attributes (phenes) through time. This  approach avoids an ontological 
dependence on similarity (an epistemological role is  permissible, and probably unavoidable), while also 
avoiding a simplistic view of the genotype-phenotype map. In this  section I focus  narrowly on homology 
statements  that connect traits  in parents  and offspring, whereas  the next sections  will expand this  treatment 
to consider more distantly related pairs of  organisms.
I inherited my parents’ middle fingernails precisely because I inherited DC genes  from my parents  that 
cause the production of these fingernails. This  leads  to a generic definition of the homology relation: phene 
X in a parent is  homologous  to phene Y in its  offspring if the nucleotide positions  that make up the DC genes 
of X are orthologous  to the nucleotide positions  that make up the DC genes  of Y.8 This  definition is 
straightforward when there is  precisely one DC gene that causes  phene X and one that causes  phene Y. But 
what if  phene X or Y are associated with multiple equivalent DC genes?
Suppose that four equivalent DC genes cause phene X in a parent: (i) genetic factor 1; (ii) genetic factor 
2; (iii) genetic factors 3 and 4 together; and, (iv) genetic factors 5 and 6 together. Now suppose that changes 
somewhere in the genome have altered development such that the phene caused by DC gene A is  different 
than the phene caused by DC genes  B and C. Further, let us suppose that, although genetic factors  5 and 6 
have orthologs in both genomes, there is  no part of the offspring that is  dependent on genetic factors  5 and 6 
together (i.e., not caused by either 5 or 6 alone), meaning that there is  no DC gene D in the offspring. As  a 
result of these changes, there are two phenes in the offspring, Y1 and Y2, which each have some claim to be 
the homolog of the single phene in the parent (Figure 2). Are Y1 or Y2, or both, or neither homologous to X? 
Three alternative approaches to answering this question present themselves. 
The first approach may be called maximal homology. It asserts  that two phenes  are homologous  if all DC 
genes  are orthologs: a phene in a parent is  homologous  to a phene in its  offspring if all equivalent DC genes 
for the phene in the parent also are DC genes  for the phene in the offspring, and vice versa. In the hypothetical 
case (Figure 2), neither phene Y1 nor phene Y2, nor any other part of the offspring is  homologous  to the 
parental phene X. The parental phene has  disappeared, and two new phenes have appeared in the offspring. 
Maximal homology is  not a viable concept because it implies  that traits  cannot persist through time in the 
face of even minor changes  in genetic causation. However, for completeness, and as  a contrast to the other 
two approaches, I will continue to explicate this approach in subsequent sections.
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The second approach may be called minimal homology. It asserts  that two phenes  are homologous if there 
is  at least one shared, orthologous  DC gene. In the hypothetical case, phenes  Y1 and Y2 of the offspring are 
both (minimally) homologous  to the parental phene X. Or, turning it around, the parental phene shows 
homology to two offspring traits. This  illustrates  that minimal homology relations  can split and merge over 
time. Nonetheless, they are much more durable than maximal homology relations  in the sense that the only 
way that homology can be lost is  if a DC gene in one organism has no ortholog in the other organism, or if 
the ortholog is  present but is not a DC gene (i.e., it does  not cause any part of the phenotype). Thus, losing 
homologs  is  much harder under minimal homology than under maximal homology. The minimal homology 
framework embodies  the idea that homology relations  need not be all-or-none but are instead made up of 
multiple lower-level (DC gene) homology relations that are potentially at odds with one another. 
The third approach to parent-offspring homology is  consensus homology. It asserts  that at most one trait in 
an offspring should be considered homologous  to a specified trait in a parent and vice versa. In cases  where 
different DC genes  suggest different homology relations, the single true homology relation is  that which 
applies  (reciprocally) to the largest number of shared DC genes. Suppose the parent has  a phene Pp that is 
determined by N DC genes  and the offspring has phene Po with M DC genes. We may then specify that Pp 
and Po are consensus homologous if and only if the number of DC genes shared by Pp and Po (N∩M) is 
greater than the number of DC genes that Pp shares  with any other phene in the offspring, and also greater 
than the number of DC genes  that Po shares  with any other phene in the parent. In the example shown in 
Figure 1, Trait Y2 of the offspring (which shares  two DC genes), but not Y1 (which shares just one DC gene), is 
homologous to X of  the parent. 
The consensus  approach seems  most compelling in cases  where a phene is  determined by many DC 
genes. If this  were so, then, under the reasonable assumption that few DC genes  change their causal impact 
between one generation and the next, consensus  homology would be objective and unambiguous. However, 
it is  an empirically open question how many DC genes  determine typical organismic traits, meaning that the 
applicability of  the consensus approach remains open to scrutiny.
6. Homology over the Long Haul
The preceding section discussed homology relations between parents  and offspring, resulting in the 
recognition of three different causal homology concepts  that differ in how they deal with generation-to-
generation changes  in the relationships among equivalent DC genes. In order to extend this  analysis  across 
additional generations, we need to accommodate the potentially much longer path of ancestry separating 
the two organisms  under consideration. As  illustrated in Figure 3, the path of ancestry between two organisms, 
Figure 2 — Part of  the DC map of  a parent and an offspring. Phene X in the parent is multiply determined by 
four distinct DC genes. One of  these DC genes, D, is non-causal in the offspring. Additionally, DC genes A and B
+C individuate different phenes in the offspring: Y1 and Y2, respectively.
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A and B, may be defined as  the set of all organisms  that are ancestors  of A or B and are either the last 
common ancestor of A and B or are descendants  of that last common ancestor.9 One way to understand the 
homology relationship between particular phenes  (PA and PB) in a pair of focal organisms  (A and B, 
respectively) is  to proceed as  if A and B were a parent-offspring pair and look at which DC genes control the 
phenes  of each organism. That is  to say, we would directly compare A and B and require that PA and PB 
depend upon orthologous DC genes. 
The direct approach faces  one immediate problem. By looking at the homology of DC genes  causing PA 
and PB, we are effectively assessing the similarity of genetic causation of two traits  rather than their sameness 
(Ramsey and Paterson 2012). But most biologists  would not want to treat the traits  of two species as 
homologous  if they independently acquired a causal dependence on orthologous  DC genes. Such a 
conclusion would go against conventional understanding, which would view this  as  an instance of 
homoplasy, not homology.
We could rescue the direct approach to homology by modifying the definition to require continuity of 
dependence on the same DC genes  along the path of ancestry back to common ancestry. In addition to 
being inelegant, this  approach fails  to solve another problem. It is  now widely accepted that traits  can persist 
indefinitely in the face of gradual turn over in their genetic causation, so-called developmental system drift (True 
and Haag 2001; Haag 2007). Consequently, most biologists  would consider it at least theoretically possible 
for traits in two species  to be true homologs, but lack any orthologous  DC genes. The lenses  of shark and 
frog eyes  could be homologs  even if there were no homologous  DC genes that individuated the anatomical 
lens of  both sharks and frogs. 
An alternative approach that solves  these problems  is  to not directly compare the DC maps of the extant 
taxa but to look at the parent-offspring pairs  that make up the path of ancestry. In this case, PA and PB are 
homologous  if they are linked by traits  in intervening generations  such that each parental phene is 
homologous  to each offspring phene.10 Under this  approach, the DC genes that confer homology are reset 
each generation; the DC genes  that confer homology from an offspring to parent may be different from the 
ones  that confer homology of that parent to its parent (the grandparent). As  a consequence, the genetic 
causes  of traits  can shift along the path of ancestry such that PA and PB could be homologous  even if they 
share no DC genes in common. While there may be some phenomena that are better captured using the 
direct approach,11 the reset version of homology is preferable and will be adopted for the remainder of the 
paper. The reset approach can be applied equally under maximal,12 minimal,13 and consensus  homology.14 
In the minimal and consensus  formulations, but not the maximal one, turnover in DC genes  across  the path 
of  ancestry permits traits in two extant species to be homologs while lacking any orthologous DC genes.
Figure 3 — Homology across a path of  ancestry. The path of  ancestry from organism A to organism B includes 
the parents of  A (PA) and B (PB), the grandparents of  A (GA) and B (GB), the great-grandparents of  A and B, and 
so on back to the last common ancestor of  A and B (LCA). The homology of  phene PA in organism A and phene PB 
in organism B can be assessed directly (double-headed arrow, at top) or generation-by-generation (small double-
headed arrows, below).
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7. Shared Features of  Developmental-Causal Homology Concepts
Before progressing to discuss  the pros  and cons  of these three homology concepts, it will be useful to 
highlight a few features  that they share. This  will serve to clarify how my approach differs  from other 
attempts  to solve the homology problem. First, it is  worth stressing that phene homology is  established only 
by the homology of DC  genes, which in turn is  established by the orthology of the causal genetic factors—
the inheritance of genotypic information. In this  chain of reasoning, similarity has  no place. The statement 
that the traits  of two organisms  are homologous is  true or false regardless  of how similar or different the 
traits  are in position, structure, or development. The homology of traits  might be hypothesized originally 
because of some observed similarity, and the similarity of traits  may provide evidence for or against a 
homology hypothesis, but the presence of similarity is  not required for a homology hypothesis  to be correct. 
This fact is  important because it allows  that homology—descent from common ancestry—can be offered as 
an explanation of  similarity without leading to a tautology.
A second major implication of the developmental causal approach is  that it satisfies  the criterion of 
transitivity, which has  been highlighted as  a critical feature of homology (Ghiselin 2005; Ramsey and 
Peterson 2012). Transitivity means  that, if PA in organism A and PB in organism B are homologs, and PA is 
homologous  to PC, in organism C, then PB and PC must also be homologs. Assuming tree-like ancestry, such 
that there is  only one path of ancestry between two terminal taxa, transitivity holds for maximal and 
consensus  homology. This  follows because under these concepts  each phene in one generation has  precisely 
one homolog in the generations  on either side (parental and offspring). In the case of minimal homology, 
transitivity holds, but only if we modify the definition of transitivity to specify the DC gene conferring 
homology. If PA in organism A and PB in organism B are minimal homologs  due to the sharing of a DC gene 
and PA is  homologous  to PC, in organism C, due to the sharing of the same DC gene, then PB and PC must 
also be homologs. This  provides yet another contrast with similarity-based homology concepts, which will 
generally fail to satisfy a transitivity criterion (Ghiselin 2005).
A third major implication of the DC approach relates  to the phenomenon of serial or iterative 
homology. Many approaches  to homology imply that serially repeated units  within a single organism are 
homologous  to one another in the same way that the units themselves  are homologous  between individuals. 
For example, it is  commonly held that my fore and hind limbs  are homologs in much the same way that my 
fore limbs  are homologous  to the wings of a chicken. The general thrust of the argument is  that fore and 
hind limbs  depend on the reutilization of largely (but not entirely) the same developmental program, in 
much the same way that shared genes  make structures  in different organisms  homologous  via continuity of 
information (Van Valen 1982; Roth 1984). How does  the framework described here accommodate the 
phenomenon referred to as serial homology?
The use of one genetic program to generate multiple features  of an organism implies that each structure 
is  dependent on this  program. This would mean that the “repeated” structures  are all dependent on the 
same DC gene. However, this  does  not make the repeated structures  homologs. On the contrary, this  shows 
that the repeated structures  are all parts  of a single, more inclusive phene. For example there is  likely to be a 
phene in the tetrapod “limb” that includes, nested within it, two other traits: “fore limbs” and “hind limbs.” 
This means  we could consider the fore limbs  of two different animals  to be homologous, but does  not justify 
considering the fore and hind limbs  of one animal as  homologous to each other. Instead the fore and hind 
limbs of  a single animal are best viewed as two aspects of  a single inclusive trait, limbs. 
A final general point is  that my framework ensures  that homologs  are heritable (in the sense of “capable 
of being inherited”) over multiple generations. This  is  important because it explains  why homologs  can 
come to characterize clades  of organisms  and, consequently, why the sharing of putative homologs  can 
provide prima facie evidence that a certain group of organisms forms  a clade. On the other hand, this 
approach does  not sit well with synonymizing homology and synapomorphy (e.g., Patterson 1982). 
Homology is  here understood to be a pairwise relationship between the traits  of different organisms, 
whereas  synapomorphies are traits  shared by a set of organisms, where that set manifests  a derived state 
relative to the plesiomorphic state that is  seen in another subset of organisms. My approach allows  that 
plesiomorphic character-states shared by a pair of  organisms may nonetheless be homologous.
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8. Choosing among Developmental-Causal Homology Concepts
The preceding discussion has  identified three developmental-causal definitions  of homology: maximal, 
minimal, and consensus  homology. These concepts  are identical when each phene is  associated with a single 
DC gene but, when there are multiple equivalent DC genes, a pair of traits  judged homologous  by one 
criterion might not be homologous  under another. It behooves us, therefore, to consider whether any one 
concept is universally superior, or if  two (or all three) might have value in certain contexts.
The maximal homology concept ties  phenes to exactly specified sets  of DC genes. Within this  framework 
traits  are evolutionarily ephemeral, disappearing the minute there is  a loss  or gain of any of the DC genes 
associated with a multiply determined phene. Maximal homology implies  that phenotypic evolution largely 
occurs  via the disappearance of old traits  and the appearance of new ones. Since one important motivation 
of homology is  the idea of trait persistence through evolutionary time in the face of genetic turnover, 
maximal homology is unlikely to be of  great utility for comparative biology. 
The minimal approach to homology has  immediate value as  a way to communicate when two traits 
share orthologous  DC genes, but could be considered too fine-grained. By associating traits  with DC genes 
that can pass  into or out of equivalency, phenes  tend to split and merge over evolutionary time; one trait in 
species A can have multiple minimal homologs in species  B. While some biologists  will find this  implication 
distasteful, others have already come to terms  with such conclusions (e.g., Sattler 1984, 1988; Wake 1999). 
For example, the idea of mixed (or partial) homology has  been found useful for exploring cases  of 
developmental evolution through “transference of function” (Corner 1958; Baum and Donoghue 2002). 
Furthermore, we have a linguistic framework for handling situations  of mixed homology. It is  the norm to 
modify homology statements  along these lines: “The wings  of birds  and bats  are homologous  as fore limbs.” 
The implication is  that these traits  are not homologous in some other context (e.g., as  wings). The minimal 
homology approach suggests  a more mechanistic version of such modifying clauses, along the lines: “phenes 
PA and PB are homologous as traits dependent on DC gene X.”
Minimal homology defines a challenging yet tractable research program. To validate a claim of 
homology between traits  in two taxa we would first identify DC genes  that cause these phenotypes. This 
might entail studies of mutants in both taxa or, possibly, inferences based on nearby taxa and gene 
expression data. Either way, the aim would be to identify sets  of genetic factors  required for the production 
of the two traits. Then we would use molecular evolutionary analysis  to test the orthology of these causal 
genetic factors. Finally, we could use data from other related taxa, combined with ancestral state inference 
methods, to assess  whether ancestral organisms had phenes caused by the same DC genes. That being said, 
while it might be practical to validate a minimal homology hypothesis, refuting such a hypothesis  would be 
much harder. Analogous  to Gould and Lewontin’s  (1979) famous  critique of the adaptationist program, a 
hypothesis  of minimal homology could be indefinitely defended by claiming that there is  some as-yet-
unidentified, shared DC gene.
The consensus  approach also has  value. In particular it provides a good way to think about how a phene 
that has  many equivalent DC genes can persist as a single entity even if individual DC  genes intermittently 
lose causal efficacy or peal off to cause different phenes. The consensus  concept will be less  useful in cases 
where phenes  have very few equivalent DC genes, or when nearly equal subsets  of equivalent DC genes 
separate en masse, but it is  an unsettled empirical question how often these conditions  will obtain. As a 
research endeavor, however, testing a hypothesis  of consensus homology would be challenging. The number 
of DC genes that potentially causes  each trait may be quite numerous, and each would require the same kind 
of analysis demanded by minimal homology. Nonetheless, because the focus  of inference is quite well 
defined, this  research program is  at least viable and may become easier if genomic methods  advance to the 
point where we can determine the relationships  among the phenes  caused by a large numbers  of potentially 
equivalent DC genes. 
All together, it appears  that both minimal and consensus  homology have useful roles  to play in 
enhancing clear communication and helping frame viable research programs. In contrast, given the typical 
baggage associated with the term homology, it is far from obvious that maximal homology has much to offer.
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9. Areas for Further Work
Much further work on the developmental causal approach is  certainly needed. This  can be divided into 
three areas: philosophy, developmental theory, and empirical application. I will briefly summarize some 
issues needing attention in each of  these three areas.
All three homology concepts depend on a counterfactual causal criterion, which is  not without its 
complications  (e.g., Pearl 2000; Godfrey-Smith 2010). I presented a thought experiment built around the 
question: What attributes of the organism would be absent if particular genetic factors  were absent? An 
alternative formulation would be to ask: What aspects  of the organism would be absent if such and such a 
genetic factor were different? That is, consider not just the possibility that genetic factors  were absent, but also 
that they had different sequences. While this  might usefully expand the information that could be captured 
in a DC map, it also seems to define an infinitely large and unwieldy space (similar to the genotype space of 
Stadler et al. 2001). We would need to consider every possible genomic configuration that could in any way 
yield a differently constructed organism. Indeed, since all pairs  of living organisms are a finite number of 
mutational steps  away from one another, this  implies  that we could find ourselves asking unsatisfactory 
questions  such as: Which genetic factors  explain the lack of wings in humans? Is  the lack of wings  in 
humans homologous  to the lack of wings  in crabs? This  is  a pathological outcome. There may be good 
philosophical grounds  for defending the counterfactual reasoning laid out in this  paper. Alternatively, we 
may find that counterfactual reasoning is  best deployed to test a priori hypotheses rather than to ascertain 
trait boundaries. What the biologist needs  is  not a way to define abstract traits  that could be homologs, but a 
reasonable way forward when assessing whether two perceived traits are indeed homologous. 
In the area of developmental theory, more work is  needed on the relationship between my conceptual 
model and the line of research pursued most prominently by Günter Wagner and collaborators  (e.g., 
Wagner 1989; Wagner and Misof 1993; Wagner and Altenberg 1996; Wagner and Laublichler 2000; 
Stadler et al. 2001; Wagner and Stadler 2003). Their approach proposes  that the most obvious  traits of 
organisms  are those that are products  of natural selection. The idea is  that selection can act on the 
developmental process  to build Character Identity Networks  (ChINs), which are emergent features  of 
developmental programs that individuate characters and explain character persistence through time 
(Wagner 2007). One possibility is  that ChINs  will, in my framework, correspond to phenes  with large 
numbers  of equivalent DC genes. If this  were the case, the phenes in question would be more durable 
through evolutionary time. However, many questions  remain. For example, when will selection favor greater 
numbers  of equivalent DC genes? By providing a trait concept that does  not invoke selection, my 
counterfactual causal approach might provide a framework for asking some fascinating new questions  about 
how selection shapes the genotype-phenotype map.
Finally, and perhaps  most critically, there is  a need for the analysis of empirical data. There are many 
questions  that can only be answered by looking at the biology. Do the familiar traits  of organisms 
correspond to phenes  and, if so, how many equivalent DC genes  are they caused by? Over evolutionary 
time, how readily and by what molecular mechanisms  do DC genes  appear or disappear or change the 
phenes  they cause? What is  the impact of gene duplication and loss  on assessments  of homology? It is  my 
hope that the conceptual framework laid out in this paper will stimulate the development of methods  for 
mining existing genetic data as well as  new methods  for automated phenotypic analysis  to identify DC genes 
and phenes  in a high-throughput manner. Through such work, we will get to the point that statements such 
as  “my middle finger nails  are homologous  to horses  hooves” can be assessed by more than simply appealing 
to human perceptions of  spatial correspondence. 
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Notes
1. Instead of conditioning narrowly on the current environment in which an organism lives,  one could condition on 
the breadth of plausible environments that a member of this  species  might plausibly encounter. This  would 
probably be the most sensible course of action in cases  where one is trying to understand the genotype-phenotype 
mapping for a whole population or species rather than for a single individual. The phenotype is then a norm of 
reaction.
2. Some of these features may be absences. For example,  a genetic factor that suppresses  facial hair can be said to 
cause the feature “facial hair reduced.”
3. In the idealized case we would even consider heritable features that are not encoded at the DNA sequence level, 
which is to say epigenetic factors.
4. It might be reasonable in some contexts to limit this exercise to perhaps two or three levels (e.g., considering only 
the loss of up to three genetic factors). This would amount to focusing on a short enough timeframe that 
combinations  of multiple mutations would be very unlikely to evolve. It is  an empirical matter whether familiar 
traits would be successfully individuated in such truncated developmental causal maps.
5. The term phene has  received occasional usage in scientific publication to refer to a specific aspect of the 
phenotype (e.g., Nanney 1982; Vidaykin 2001; Komosinski and Ulatowksi 2004; Lynch and Brown 2012). These 
prior uses are compatible with, if  less precise than, the usage I am advocating here.
6. It is  an empirical question whether we will find cases in which a perceptually compelling trait is  not associated 
with a phene but with the intersection (e.g., A ∩ B) or complement relation (e.g., A/B) of two (or more) phenes. In 
that case we could admit the possibility of two kinds of valid traits, phenes and paraphenes, with the former being 
directly individuated and the latter being delimited only by relations among phenes. It would be possible to extend 
the homology concepts developed here to paraphenes,  but such an extension is inadvisable until we establish that a 
purely phene-based approach is problematic.
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7. An exception applies to those phenes that correspond to fitness (e.g., number of offspring), because this will 
eventually be important when or if a theory emerges that integrates developmental causation and evolutionary 
change by natural selection.
8. Gene duplication will complicate the situation, but I set this issue aside here.
9. In cases  where A and B are connected by multiple paths of ancestry (e.g., because they are members of a single 
sexual population), phenes PA in A and PB in B correspond to homologous traits if there is  at least one path of 
ancestry across which they satisfy the relevant definition of  homology.
10. Direct homology approaches may be useful for exploring developmental constraint or “burden,” wherein the role 
of some genetic factors  is extremely stable through evolutionary time (e.g., Maynard Smith et al. 1985; Laubichler 
2000).
11. In the case of sex-limited traits, the existence of a trait is only required of organisms  of the appropriate sex. This 
allows, for example, a sex-limited trait of a male organism and his maternal grandfather to be considered 
homologs even though the intervening generation (his mother) lacked the trait. One way to think about this  is to 
consider the sexes as alternative possible “environments” in which the organism could have found itself.
12. Formally: phenes  PA and PB show maximal homology if and only if they are linked through a phene in each 
parent-offspring pair along the path of ancestry such that all the equivalent DC genes of parents and offspring 
traits are orthologous.
13. Formally: phenes PA and PB show minimal homology if and only if they are linked through a phene in each 
parent-offspring pair along the path of ancestry such that parental and offspring phenes share at least one 
orthologous DC gene.
14. Formally: phenes PA and PB show consensus homology if and only if they are linked through a phene in each 
parent-offspring pair along the path of ancestry such that parental phenes share more equivalent orthologous DC 
genes with the offspring phene than with any other phene in the offspring, and vice versa.
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